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Abstract— Wash trade refers to the illegal activities of traders 
who utilise carefully designed limit orders to manually increase 
the trading volumes for creating a false impression of an active 
market. As one of the primary formats of market abuse, wash 
trade can be extremely damaging to the proper functioning and 
integrity of capital markets. Existing work focuses on collusive 
clique detections based on certain assumptions of trading 
behaviours. Effective approaches for analysing and detecting 
wash trade in a real-life market have yet to be developed. This 
paper analyses and conceptualises the basic structures of the 
trading collusion in a wash trade by using a directed graph of 
traders. A novel method is then proposed to detect the potential 
wash trade activities involved in a financial instrument by first 
recognizing the suspiciously matched orders and then further 
identifying the collusions among the traders who submit such 
orders. Both steps are formulated as a simplified form of the 
Knapsack problem, which can be solved by dynamic 
programming approaches. The proposed approach is evaluated 
on seven stock datasets from NASDAQ and the London Stock 
Exchange. Experimental results show that the proposed approach 
can effectively detect all primary wash trade scenarios across the 
selected datasets. 
Index Terms—Market Abuse, Directed Graph, Dynamic 
Programming, Wash Trade. 
 
I.! INTRODUCTION 
urveillance of a financial exchange market for preventing 
market abuse activities has been attracting significant 
academic and industrial attention after the financial crisis in 
2008 and especially since the flash crash in 2010. The abuse of 
financial markets can occur in a variety of ways, all of which 
can be extremely damaging to the proper functioning and 
integrity of the market. Trade-based manipulation, where the 
manipulation tactic is carried out only by simply buying and 
selling (Franklin & Douglas, Stock Price Manipulation, 1992), 
is one of the primary forms. Price and volume are usually two 
major objects to be manipulated, and the former format, price 
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manipulation, is thoroughly studied in a previous work by the 
authors (Cao, Li, Coleman, Belatreche, & T.M.McGinnity, 
Adaptive Hidden Markov Model with Anomaly States for Price 
Manipulation Detection, 2015) (Cao, Li, Coleman, Belatreche, 
& McGinnity, A Hidden Markov Model with Abnormal States 
for Detecting Stock Price Manipulation, Oct. 2013) (Cao, Li, 
Coleman, Belatreche, & McGinnity, Detecting price 
manipulation in the financial market, Mar. 2014) (Cao, Li, 
Coleman, Belatreche, & McGinnity, Detecting wash trade in 
the financial market, Mar. 2014) (Zhai & Cao, Mar. 2014). 
Another format of trade-based abuse is volume manipulation, 
the manipulation actions intending to increase the transaction 
volume for the purpose of giving a false impression of high 
trading volume on the market (Franklin & Douglas, Stock Price 
Manipulation, 1992) (Franklin, Litov, & Mei, Large investors, 
price manipulation, and limits to arbitrage: An anatomy of 
market corners, 2006). The major form of volume manipulation 
is wash trade, which occurs when the same individuals or a 
group of collusive clients are on both sell and buy sides of a 
financial instrument (i.e. stock) trading. While there is no 
beneficial change in ownership, wash trading has the effect of 
creating a misleading appearance of an active interest in the 
stock (Douglas, Feng, & Aitken, 2012). 
Wash trade usually does not contain any illegal actions such 
as financial rumour spreading and market resource squeezing 
but is carried out only by legitimate trading activities. With 
carefully designed buy and sell order sequences, manipulators 
can make the transaction follow their expectation. In the wash 
trade tactics, a series of orders is often submitted as a number of 
order pairs. The monitoring of any single leg of one pair or part 
of a pair would not be concluded as collusive trading. Most of 
the existing related literature studies the collusive cliques 
according to the “activity similarity”, which is defined under 
certain assumptions. Very few address quantitative analysis of 
the features of different wash trade scenarios and the 
corresponding detection approaches. This paper follows on 
from our previous work on trade-based manipulation (Cao, Li, 
Coleman, Belatreche, & T.M.McGinnity, Adaptive Hidden 
Markov Model with Anomaly States for Price Manipulation 
Detection, 2015) and proposes a detection approach that 
considers a complete spectrum of the wash trade detection. The 
main contributions of the work are as follows: the problem of 
wash trade is thoroughly discussed including the analysis of all 
possible scenarios, from which the key features are extracted 
and quantified. This provides a clear problem formulation and 
explains the significance of exploring the conceptual models. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first theoretical study 
of wash trade market manipulation. A two-step algorithm is 
proposed to detect wash trade activities. The proposed two 
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steps, which consist of discovering the matching orders and 
further recognizing the collusions, are both formulated as a 
combinatorial optimisation problem and solved by one unified 
algorithm. Extensive experiments have been conducted on real 
data from both USA and UK markets for testing the 
practicability of the proposed wash trade detection method in 
real-life. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 
II provides a review of wash trade manipulation and the 
corresponding detection methods. The features of all types of 
wash trade scenarios as well as the proposed detection approach 
are analysed, formulated and characterised in Section III. 
Performance evaluation of the proposed approach is provided 
in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper and 
discusses potential improvements and future work. 
II.! WASH TRADE AND ITS DETECTION 
A.! Wash Trade 
In capital markets, limit orders, indicate the trading intention 
of the trader to buy or sell volumes of a specific equity at a 
specific price or better (SEC, 2011) (“Better price” refers to 
higher selling prices or lower buying prices). The transaction 
occurs when eligible orders meet order-matching rules. The 
outstanding unmatched limit orders are recorded in order books 
of the exchange market, in which the highest buying price 
decides the best bid price while the lowest selling price is the 
best ask price. The gap between the best bid and ask price is 
defined as bid-ask spread (Kojo & Paudyal, 2000). In most of 
the exchange markets, the matching rule selects the earliest 
order with the matched price for execution. In the following 
examples in Table 1, three limit orders, #01, #02 and #03 are 
submitted in sequence to the exchange market. According to 
the matching rule, order #03 is firstly executed by 300 shares 
with #01, which has the same price but is earlier than order #02, 
and then the remaining 100 shares are executed with #02. 
 
Table 1 Limit order sequences 
Order # Trader Time Buy/Sell Price Volume 
01 A 09:00:000 Buy 125 300 
02 A 09:05:000 Buy 125 300 
03 B 09:06:100 Sell 125 400 
 
Wash trades follow the same matching rules as legitimate 
transactions with the special feature defined by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) as “no change in beneficial interest 
or market risk”, or “the transfer of beneficial interest or market 
risk only between parties acting in concert or collision, other 
than for legitimate reasons” (FSA, 2006). The Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR) further indicates that a 
wash trade is the “deliberate arrangement in concert or 
collusion” (EU, Market Abuse Directive, 2014). On August 28 
2014, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) released a new 
rule (adopted by U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission CFTC), termed as “Rule 575” (CME, 2014). Rule 
575 clearly states that “no person shall enter messages to the 
market as pre-arranged collusion (wash trade) with intent to 
mislead other participants”. The definition in Rule 575 in the 
U.S. shows the consistent regulation to CESR in Europe that 
the pre-arranged collusive trading is wash trade and shall be 
strictly prohibited. Although clearly defined the wash trade 
activity, the regulators (FCA, CESR, and CFTC) do not provide 
any quantitative approach on detecting such activities. 
As illustrated by the example in Table 2, the simplest format 
of wash trade is the simultaneous submission of two opposite 
limit orders with identical price (125 in Table 2) and similar 
volume (495 in Table 2) from one trader A. By the matching 
rules, order #01 and #02 match and 495 shares are executed 
immediately after the submission. Additionally, the wash trade 
actions can be also carried out by multiple orders and traders as 
the example formats shown in Table 3 and Table 4. In Table 3, 
order #03 is matched and executed with #01 and #02 
sequentially so that a transaction of 490 shares can be 
artificially created by trader A. In Table 4, two transactions are 
created by four matched orders between traders A and B. After 
the transactions (450 matched volumes), there is almost no 
effective transfer of beneficial interest among the two traders. 
 
Table 2 Basic format of wash trade 
Order # Trader Time Buy/Sell Price Volume 
01 A 09:00:000 Buy 125 500 
02 A 09:00:001 Sell 125 495 
 
Summarising the typical formats in Table 2 and Table 4 as 
well as the definitions from the regulators, we obtain three 
features of a successful execution of a wash trade manipulation: 
1.! Tight submission intervals between the matched buy 
and sell orders (to minimize the risk of the orders 
being unintentionally picked up by other traders); 
2.! Executable prices (to make the orders an immediate 
execution); 
3.! Mostly matched volumes (to minimize the risk of loss 
from the unmatched volumes executed with other 
traders). 
 
Table 3 Wash trade with multiple orders 
Order # Trader Time Buy/Sell Price Volume 
01 A 09:00:000 Buy 125 250 
02 A 09:00:001 Buy 125 250 
03 A 09:00:002 Sell 125 490 
 
Table 4 Wash trade with multiple traders 
Order # Trader Time Buy/Sell Price Volume 
01 A 09:00:000 Buy 125 500 
02 B 09:00:001 Sell 124.2 490 
03 B 09:10:000 Buy 125.5 490 
04 A 09:10:001 Sell 125 500 
 
Perfect matching orders, which have the same price, volume 
and submission time according to the summarised features, 
guarantee the execution but are obviously easy to be suspected 
as market abuse trade by the regulators. Therefore, to avoid 
being easily detected, “smart manipulators” design the wash 
trade orders to be “mostly matched” such as the examples in 
Table 2 and Table 4, where around 99% volumes are executed, 
respectively. Similarly, due to the matching rules in most 
exchange markets (Bowen, 2013), that is buy (sell) limit order 
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matching sell (buy) limit orders with the same price or lower 
(higher), the limit prices in the examples in Table 4, which are 
different but executable, are also deliberately designed to avoid 
inspection. In Table 4, order #02 can be executed with order 
#01 at price 125 and order #04 can be executed with order #03 
at price 125.5. The 125 and 125.5 are the execution prices of the 
two possible transactions; we refer to such prices as transaction 
prices. 
B.! Wash Trade Detection 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no related work on the 
detection of wash trade activities in capital markets. The only 
analogous research is work on the detection of collusive cliques 
based on certain similar trading behaviours, which are defined 
as the buy/sell activities of equities in a similar way. A spectral 
clustering based approach was developed (Markus., Hoser, & 
Schröder, 2007), where a trading-behavioural network is 
generated and any behaviour that deviates from the network is 
reported as an irregularity. The assumption of this work is the 
strong consistency between a trader’s current behaviours and 
his/her previous trading network. A graph clustering algorithm 
for detecting a set of collusive traders has been proposed in 
(Palshikar & Apte, 2008). The relationship between traders is 
constructed as a stock flow graph, and those with “heavy 
trading” within their network are clustered as a collusion set. 
A new trading collusion detection approach, the correlation 
matrix of one trading day, was presented in recent work (Wang, 
Zhou, & Guan, 2012), where trader behaviour was represented 
by an aggregated time series of signed volumes of submitted 
orders. The similarities of behaviours among multiple traders 
are measured by Pearson’s product-moment coefficient and the 
cliques with a coefficient higher than a user-specified threshold 
were considered as suspicious collusions. The experiments of 
this study evaluated the real order data of futures traded in the 
Shanghai Futures Exchange. The “signed order volume” is 
constructed by volumes and directions (buy/sell) of the order. 
The order price information is ignored according to the 
assumption that order prices are not related to the trader’s 
behaviours (Wang, Zhou, & Guan, 2012). However, the market 
impact measure shows that order price significantly impacts the 
market (Hautsch & Huang, The market impact of a limit order, 
2012) so that the market moves caused by the traders’ own 
actions (orders) become the principal part of the transaction 
costs (ITG, 2013). It is therefore unacceptable to ignore the 
order price information, which not only distinguishes traders’ 
intention, but is a key feature of wash trade manipulation 
tactics. 
A technique developed by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME) to prevent wash trades at the “engine level” was rolled 
out in the middle of 2011 (Patterson, Strasburg, & Trindle, 
2013) and updated in the summer of 2013 (Bowen, 2013). 
However, it only monitored the same-priced buy/sell orders 
from trading accounts with the same beneficial ownership 
(Bowen, 2013) (example in Table 2). The lack of the 
surveillance mechanisms for wash trades with multiple orders 
or traders (example illustrations in Table 3 and  
Table 4) left it possible for collusive parties to create a 
number of transactions that give a false appearance of large 
trading volumes. 
In December 2012, a wash trade case was manually 
inspected and documented by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (Jamal, 2012).  In March 2013, the US 
regulators started to investigate traders acting as both buyer and 
seller in the same transactions and reported that several hundred 
potential wash trades occur each day on CME and 
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) (Patterson, Strasburg, & 
Trindle, 2013). In June 2012, the Hong Kong financial 
regulator claimed that the attempts of entering wash trade or 
matched trade were financial manipulation crimes whether or 
not the wash trade or matched trade in fact has, or is likely to 
have, the effect of misleading appearance (Loh & Cumming, 
2012). This ruling was also accepted by “Rule 575” (CME, 
2014) and the Market Abuse Directive II (EU, European 
Commission, 2015). This rule provided an aggressive 
restriction: any attempts of wash trade or matched trade are 
financial crimes. 
To date, academic research has mainly focused on detecting 
the overall trading collusions according to defined analogous 
behaviours. The detection of mass market behaviours can 
hardly reach a precise and determinable manipulation detection 
result but can show a collective correlation of trading activities 
among different trader clusters. Industry techniques merely 
covered the simple format of wash trade scenarios. A slightly 
improved manipulation tactic can bypass the wash trade 
monitoring. However, no efforts appear to have been made in 
the analysis of wash trade strategic behaviour or the design of a 
detection approach identifying any tactics of attempts of wash 
trade. Given the gap in the field, it is this aspect of market 
manipulation that this paper seeks to address. This paper 
proposes a wash trade detection algorithm that monitors all 
incoming limit orders that can possibly attempt to compose a 
wash trade. Recognising such attempts helps the regulators to 
prevent market abuse by a strict regulation. 
III.! WASH TRADE DETECTION METHODOLOGY 
A.! Analysis Terminologies 
To analyse the wash trade strategic behaviours, the 
definitions and terminologies in (Tsang, Olsen, & Masry, 2013) 
are adopted and revised to formalise the trading properties and 
market changes. The effect of wash trade can be represented by 
the position of the whole trading collusion, where “position” is 
the amount of equities held by a trader. As the wash trade is 
merely fraudulent activities rather than true trading actions, 
each participated trader tends to maintain his own positions 
unchanged for minimising the unnecessary financial loss, and 
therefore the position of the whole wash trade collusive group 
is also not changed. During the wash trade process, the position 
change is caused by a number of orders from the trader in the 
collusive group and can be defined as: 
Position + Orders ! Position, 
Position is comprised of a sequence of orders:  
Position = {(Order%), (Order&)… (Order')}, 
where each order is defined as: 
Order = (Trader_ID, Type, Price, Volume), 
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where Type = buy | sell. Representing the order Type buy and 
sell by positive and negative signs respectively and affixing the 
sign to the Trader_ID and Volume, a sell order can be 
represented as: 
 Order = (-Trader_ID, Price, -Volume). (1) 
By this, the orders in Table 4 can be illustrated as: 
Position={ (A, 125, 500), (-B, 124.2, -450), 
 (B, 125.5, 450), (-A, 125, -500)    }. 
The buy/sell orders having matched prices can be merged as: 
Position={  ( A-B, 125, 500-450=50 ),  
  ( B-A, 125.5, 450-500=-50 )  }, 
As discussed in Section II.A, prices 125 and 125.5 are 
represented as transaction prices. The difference between the 
executable limit prices is calculated as the margins of the 
transaction prices. In this case, the transaction price 125 has the 
margin 125-124.2=0.8 and the transaction price 125.5 has the 
margin 125.5-125=0.5. We merge the potential transactions 
who price margins are overlapped, i.e. 125+0.8 and 125.5+0.5 
are overlapped. After the merge, we re-represent the positions, 
i.e. the margin between 124.2 and 125.5 is represented as: 
124.85±0.65. 
Position={  A-B+B-A, 124.85±0.65, 50-50  }, 
={  “0”, 124.85±0.65, 0   }, 
 
where the Trader_ID calculation is carried out as a symbolic 
operation and 0.65 is represented as the transaction margin()* 
and 124.85 is the transaction price(+*. The zero-valued “signed 
trader ID” implies that each collusive trader transact at both 
sides (buy and sell) of the market and the zero “signed volume” 
indicate the total amounts of the transactions in both sides are 
zero: no equity is really bought or sold. Therefore, the 
unchanged position, represented through zero-valued “signed 
trader ID” and “signed volume”, indicate the wash trade 
activities in certain collusion. 
 
B.! Wash Trade among multiple traders 
As the FCA and CESR pointed out in their consultation 
reports (FSA, 2006) (EU, Market Abuse Directive, 2014), it is 
difficult to distinguish a wash trade because the format of 
trading collusions varies and the collusive transactions can be 
buried in mass numbers of normal trading activities, such as the 
complex network reported by Nanex on 31 May 2013 
(NANEX, Chicago PMI, 2013), where vertices illustrate 
traders and directional connections among vertices represent 
the transaction between traders. We utilise this idea in 
(NANEX, Chicago PMI, 2013) and represent submitted limit 
orders (from a number of traders) by a graph, where vertices 
represent traders, the short arrows affixed to the vertex 
represent the orders submitted by the trader (buying and selling 
orders are represented by arrows pointing inward and outward, 
respectively) and the dotted arrow lines represent the possible 
executed orders according to the matching rule discussed in 
Section II.A. An example of wash trade action mixed up with 
legitimate trading orders is shown in Table 5 and illustrated by 
the graph in Fig. 1. Among the 14 orders submitted by six 
traders in this example, four pairs (#1-#4 in Table 5) of wash 
trade orders are deliberately submitted by four traders with tight 
submission intervals, executable prices, and mostly matched 
volumes so that orders in each pair are suspiciously easy to 
match and execute. In Fig. 1, the possible executions of the 
orders are illustrated by four dotted arrow lines: each dotted 
arrow line connecting one pair of matched orders and the 
arrowhead indicating the transaction direction of the financial 
equity, i.e. A pointing to B means trader A sells shares of equity 
to trader B. From the illustration in Fig. 1, when participating 
wash trade activities, traders (A, B, C, and D) connect as a 
closed simple cycle (dotted arrow lines) and continuous 
transactions among the traders flow throughout the cycle in one 
single direction (either “clockwise” or “counter clockwise”) 
with each trader along the pathway “passing the parcel” 
(Aitken, Harris, & Ji, Nov. 2009). After a complete transaction 
loop, the beneficial interest has been transferred across the 
collusive group and no traders in the group have an actual 
position change. 
 
Table 5 Example of wash trade in a sequence of  
limit orders from a number of traders 
# Trader Time Buy/Sell Price Volume Pairs 
01 A 9:00:000 Sell 125.00 1450 # 1 02 B 9:00:001 Buy 125.01 1500 
03 B 9:05:000 Sell 124.95 1500 # 2 04 C 9:05:001 Buy 125.01 1450 
05 E 9:16:000 Sell 124.90 200  
06 C 9:20:000 Buy 124.90 235  
07 C 9:30:001 Sell 125.00 1450 # 3 08 D 9:30:002 Buy 125.01 1500 
09 C 9:45:000 Sell 124.80 250  
10 F 10:05:000 Buy 124.70 350  
11 D 10:50:000 Sell 125.01 1450 # 4 12 A 10:50:001 Buy 125.01 1450 
13 F 11:35:000 Sell 124.80 200  
14 E 11:50:000 Buy 124.50 550  
 
A B C
DEF
1450,
125
1500,
125.01
1500,
124.95
1450,
125.01
1450,
125
200,
125.01
235,
124.9
1500,
125.01
250,
124.8
350,
124.7
1450,
125.01
1450,
125.01
200,
124.8
550,
124.5
A, B, C, D, E,and,F:,,traders5
X :,,Trader,X,buy,orders5 X :,,Trader,X,sell,orders5
:,,possible,execution5
(1) (2)
(3)(4)
 
Fig. 1 Closed connection cycle of traders and the possible 
execution flow along the cycle in wash trade action (14 orders 
in Table 5 are mapped to the graph) 
 
The “no beneficial interest change” of all collusive traders in 
wash trade activities can also be calculated by the terminologies 
defined in Section III.A as the equation (2). 
Equation (2) shows the possible execution (the dotted arrow 
(1) in Fig. 1) of two orders in pair #1 in Table 5 due to the 
matching rule, execution occurring on earliest orders with 
matched prices, discussed in Section II.A. Similarly, the 
executions of matched pairs #2-4 in Table 5 (and the dotted 
arrows (2)-(4) in Fig. 1) are represented by equation (2). The 
aggregated results of those executions are calculated in 
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equation (2), where 50 shares of volumes are remained due to 
the “mostly matched volumes” tactic between any two “smart 
manipulator neighbours” to avoid regulatory inspections 
(Aitken, Harris, & Ji, Nov. 2009). The unmatched volumes (for 
example 2%) can then be defined as the matching margin δ- . 
Similarly, the differences between the limit order prices and 
transaction prices can be defined as limit price margin δ. and 
the transaction margin δ.*  respectively. In the following case, δ.* = 0.005. 
Position={ (-A, 125.00, -1450), (B, 125.01, 1500), 
(2) 
 (-B, 124.95, -1500), (C, 125.01, 1450), 
 (-C, 125.00, -1450), (D, 125.01, 1500), 
 (-D, 125.01, -1450), (A, 125.01, 1450)   } 
             ={ (-A+B, 125.00+0.01, +50), 
 (-B+C, 124.95+0.06, -50), 
 (-C+D, 125.00+0.01, +50), 
 (-D+A, 125.01+0, 0)    } 
              ={ ‘-A+B-B+C-C+D-D+A’, 
 124.95+0.06, 50-50+50+0   } 
              ={ ‘0’, 125.005±0.005, +50  } 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 5, the time intervals between 
different pairs can vary as random events occurred in one single 
trading day. To avoid being detected as suspiciously trading 
action, in practice, “smart manipulators” tactically place the 
pairs at separated time points as the examples in Table 5, where 
the time differences among any two pairs are completely 
different and random. To achieve this, manipulators carefully 
design each pair of matched orders to minimise the possible 
financial loss from price changes in the time period (i.e. from 
9:00 to 10:50 in Table 5) and to maintain the positions of their 
whole collusive group at zero. The separated arrangement of 
the matched pairs increases the complexity of detecting a wash 
trade under a mixture environment of both “normal” and 
“manipulative” trades. 
Additional to the example in Table 5 and Fig. 1, the matched 
pairs among any two manipulators can also be constructed by a 
number of limit orders as illustrated in Table 3, rather than 
simply matched one-to-one sell and buy orders (as the pairs in 
Table 5). For example, the matched pair #1 in Table 5 can be 
constituted by four selling orders and one buying orders as 
shown in Table 6 and illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Table 6 Example of matched pair composed of  
multiple orders in wash trade activity 
# Trader Time Buy/Sell Price Volume Pairs 
01 A 9:00:000 Sell 124.99 450 
# 1 
02 A 9:00:000 Sell 124.98 450 
03 A 9:00:000 Sell 124.97 350 
04 A 9:00:000 Sell 124.96 200 
05 B 9:00:001 Buy 125.01 1500 
 
In the examples, the submission of four sell orders is 
followed tightly by one large buy order, which matches, 
potentially executes and removes all (or most) volumes of 
previous four sell orders. The graph of the traders and the 
transaction flow are revised in Fig. 2, where the #1 matched 
pair between A and B is illustrated by four short outward arrows 
affixed to A connecting with one short inward arrows affixed to 
B through the dotted arrow and other parts of the structure of 
the whole closed cycle of the traders is remained. In the 
example in Table 6, since the buy order #05 is submitted later 
than the sell orders, it will be executed at the prices of four sell 
orders, i.e., order #05 will be firstly executed as 450 shares at 
124.99 with order #01 and then another 450 shares executed at 
124.98 with order #02 and so on. 
 
C.! Wash trade features 
From the discussion in Section III.A and III.B, the strategy 
that constructs a wash trade activity has the following two key 
features: 
Feature 1: Matched orders - as the first step of wash trade 
manipulation, traders deliberately submit the matched orders to 
the market in tiny time intervals to guarantee the execution; 
those orders can be one-to-one (examples in Table 5) or 
one-to-many matched (example in Table 6); this feature refers 
to dotted arrow lines in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2; 
Feature 2: Closed transaction cycle - any single execution of 
the matched orders does not refer to wash trade manipulation 
unless those executions constitute a closed cycle as illustrated 
in the examples shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2; this feature refers to 
closed cycle of dotted arrows among the traders in Fig. 1 and 
Fig. 2. 
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124.9
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125.01
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X :11Trader1X1buy1orders< X :11Trader1X1sell1orders<
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A
(1)
A, B, C, D, E1and1F:11traders<
 
Fig. 2 Multiple matched orders between two manipulators in 
wash trade action (14 orders in Table 5 and five orders in Table 
6 are mapped into the graph) 
Considering the example in Table 5, the manipulators set up 
the matched orders from the #01 order at time 9:00:000, but the 
wash trade is not completely constructed until the submission 
of the #12 order at time 10:50:001, which closes the transaction 
cycle. Therefore, wash trade can be detected through detecting 
the matched orders and closed cycle in two steps: 
Step 1: Detect the suspiciously matched order pairs 3 
according to the matching rule and wash trade features, tight 
submission intervals, executable prices and mostly matched 
volumes: 
Order Pair = 456758 = +:; − :=, P@ ± )B*, ±)C ,  
where(+:; − :=  represents trader(:=(selling shares of equity 
to(:; and )C and )B* represent the matching margin of volume 
and transaction price(P@; 
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Step 2: Among 3 , find the order pairs whose transaction 
price margins are overlapped, in those pairs, if some pairs fulfil 
the condition: 
Position = Order(Pair(FF∈H = "0", P@ ± )B*, ±)C ,  
a wash trade alert is triggered. 
To further formulate those features, we define the #k order(J 
submitted by trader(:= at time(KL(as: JL = (KL, ±(:=, +L, ±NL) 
where +L  and(NL  are #k order price and volume respectively 
and the positive and negative sign ± represent buy and sell 
operation. The matching margin ) is defined as a vector ) =)B, )P, )C  with three small positive values for price, time and 
volume respectively. If buy order #K is matched with K-1 sell 
orders from #1 to #K-1, their features have 1) tiny time interval: 
 K% − KQ < )P, (3) 
2) executable tiny price difference: 
 +Q − min +%, … , +QV% < )B, (4) 
3) and mostly matched volume: 
 NLWV%LX% − NQ < )C. (5) 
If K orders among N traders construct wash trade action, their 
features meet the following condition, where 5=Lis the indicator 
that if order #k from trader(:=is a sell order, then(5=L = −1, and 5=L = +1(for buy order. 
The features in equations (2)-(5) are detected in Step 1 and the 
feature in equation (6) is detected in Step 2. 
 
D.! Problem formulation 
To discover the wash trade before it completely occurs 
(fulfilling the recent regulations on preventing the attempts of 
wash trade), the detection approach is applied to the limit order 
streams instead of the trade records. The order stream is the 
sequence of limit orders received by the trading platform from 
numerous traders. The stream is updated by the “order event”, 
which could be submission, modification, cancellation or 
execution. As shown in Table 1, an order includes ID, trader ID, 
time, buy/sell sign, price and volume. In this study, we assume 
that the orders in the stream are on one specific stock. Thus the 
stock information in the stream can be ignored once the specific 
stock is determined. This assumption, on one hand, narrows the 
scope of this study specifically on the underlying problem, on 
the other hand conforms the practical trading platform 
environment, where the algorithm can be easily applied to 
selected equity. 
The Step 1, detecting the suspiciously matched order pairs 
according to equations (3)-(5), is termed as coarse detection 
while Step 2, recognising the closed cycle based on equation (6), 
is termed as fine detection. The limit order stream is then 
required to be pre-organised to commence with those two tasks. 
A physical time sliding window sized Z* is specified and the 
trading order stream can be split into two queues of consecutive 
orders: buy order queue,([\ and sell order queue,([] each of 
which maintains a size(Z*. That is, if a new orderJL(is a buy 
order, push it into([\; otherwise push it into([]. If the length of 
the updated queue is larger than(Z*, pop the earliest orders to 
maintain the length of the sliding window. The algorithm is 
described in Algorithm 1. Since the order stream is measured in 
“order event time”, Z*( is maintained by calculating the 
difference between the physical time stamps of the first and the 
last orders in the queue. Hence the number of orders in each 
queue ultimately depends on the underlying frequency of order 
activities and differs across time. (Algorithm 1 is named as 
WASH_TRADE_DETECT because it will involves all 
detection sub-functions, which are discussed in follow up 
sections.) 
The intention of the wash trade, increasing transaction 
volume, indicates that wash trades are usually associated with 
large-sized orders. Consequently, the orders with volumes 
smaller than a predefined threshold Z^ are ignored, where the 
threshold can be setup according to the requirements of the 
detection solidness. Given the limit order queues([\(and([], the 
coarse detection can then be formulated as follows: for a large 
incoming order, examine in the opposite order queue for one or 
multiple potential matching orders which are characterised by 
equation (3)-(5). The result of the coarse detection comprises 
all order combinations matched with the incoming order. 
Collusions may exist among those combinations. 
 
Algorithm 1. Wash Trade Detection – Pre-organisation 
WASH_TRADE_DETECT(LF ) 
1 Qa = ∅; Qc = ∅ 
2     while LF is a valid limit order 
3         if LF is buy 
4             Push LF into Qc 
5             while Qc length > θ@ 
6                 Pop Qc,%(to maintain(θ@ 
7         else 
8             Push LF into Qa 
9             while Qa length > θ@ 
10                 Pop Qa,%(to maintain(θ@ 
 
Similarly, the fine detection can be formulated as follows: 
given the matched order pairs, find certain sets of pairs in which 
the sum of “signed trader ID” and “signed volume” have zero 
values as the illustrations in equation (6). Defining coarse 
detection and fine detection as the function COARSE_DETECT 
and FINE_DETECT respectively, the wash trade detection is 
further designed in following section. 
E.! Coarse Detection - Matching Search 
The matching relationship of wash trade order pairs is 
summarised in equations (3)-(5). In the Coarse Detection 
process, three conditions are sequentially checked to identify 
the potential matching. 
The time matching margin()P(in equation (3) shows the tiny 
interval between the orders in a pair. Setting the length of the 
order queue (Z*  in Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 1 equivalent 
to()P, the coarse detection is designed as the illustration in Fig. 
3: given the incoming order(LF, examining the opposite orders 
in previous )P((Z*) period for potential matched orders, which 
are determined by price and volume margin, ()B( and ()C . 
Algorithm 1 is then revised as Algorithm 2 which includes both 
the COARSE_DETECT and FINE_DETECT functions, where 
Position  = 
= 
5=L:=e=X% , P@ ± )B*, ±)C  "0", P@ ± )B*, ±)C  (6) 
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the {MP} is the detected matched pairs of COARSE_DETECT. 
In financial markets, only the orders following executable 
price rules (Bowen, 2013) match and execute. Therefore the 
price margin()B(in equation (4) is constrained by the following 
rules: 
Rule 1.! Sell order matches buy orders with equal or higher 
prices; 
Rule 2.! Buy order matches sell orders with equal or lower 
prices. 
trading(order(
stream
buy(order(
queue
sell(order(
queue
Matching(?
current(incoming(order
Tθ
 
Fig. 3 Coarse Detection Scheme 
The example in Table 6, where the #5 buy order price is slightly 
higher than all previous sell orders, shows the Rule 2 of price 
margin ()B . Considering the price margin ()B , the coarse 
detection is designed as follows: given the incoming buy (sell) 
order (LF , among all executable orders (in terms of the 
executable limit prices) in the previous )P((Z*) period, find the 
order pairs having the best matching volumes. 
 
Algorithm 2. Wash Trade Detection Algorithm 
WASH_TRADE_DETECT(LF) 
1 [] = ∅; [\ = ∅; {Matched Pairs}= ∅; 
2 while LF is a valid limit order 
3         if LF is buy 
4                 Push LF into [\  
5                 while [\  length > Z*  
6                         Pop [\,%; 
7                 {MP}= COARSE_DETECT [], LF ; 
8         else 
9                 Push LF into [] 
10                while [] length > Z*  
11                        Pop [],%; 
12                { MP }= COARSE_DETECT [\, LF ; 
13        if { MP } ≠ ∅ 
14                FINE_DETECT({MP}); 
 
The volume matching can be defined as a function 
VOL_MATCH [P,B, JL , where[P,B( is a set of orders after 
being filtered by()P(and()B. Given this, COARSE_DETECT([, JL ) is defined in Algorithm 3, where([(contains all opposite 
orders in the previous(δg(periods and(LF is the incoming order. 
Based on the above discussions and the constraints in equation 
(5), the function VOL_MATCH [P,B, JL  is defined as follows: 
given incoming order(JL and a set of matched orders([P,B, find 
subsets 3 of the order pairs from [P,Bsuch that Nhh∈i − ((NL ≤ )C. 
The number of limit orders in subset(3(is k] (k]is smaller than 
the size of([P,B). In essence, the problem of VOL_MATCH is a 
practical case of a more general problem called the Knapsack 
Problem (Rumen, Vincent, & Sanjay, 2000) (Vincent, Yanev, 
& Andonov, 2009) (Zukerman, Jia, Neame, & Woeginger, 
2001). The name Knapsack refers to the problem of filling a 
knapsack of capacity l using a subset of m items( 1, … ,m , 
each of which has a mass and a value, such as the total weight 
of the selected items is less than or equal W and their total value 
is maximised. The volume matching problem can be viewed as 
a simplified form of the Knapsack Problem: given a capacity NL 
(the knapsack size) and a set ([P,B of items, each having 
non-negative size (Nh , find all possible subsets (3(of items to 
eventually make (Nhh∈i − NL ≤ ( )C. 
Due to the similarity of the two problems, the widely used 
approach solving the Knapsack Problem, dynamic 
programming, is employed in VOL_MATCH [P,B, JL . The 
main principles of dynamic programming are that we have to 
come up with a number of sub-problems so that each 
sub-problem can be solved easily from “smaller” 
sub-problems, and the solution of the original problem can be 
obtained easily once we know the solutions to all the 
sub-problems (Kleinberg & Tardos, 2005). Dynamic 
programming has been studied thoroughly in optimization 
problems in (Zhen, He, Wen, & Xu, 2013) (Jiang & Jiang, 
2014). 
 
Algorithm 3. Coarse Detection 
COARSE_DETECT(([, LF) 
1 [P,B = ∅;  
2 if(LF(is a valid buy order 
3     for each order Jh  in Q 
4         if Pn <= PF 
5             push Jh  into [P,B 
6 else if(LF(is a sell order 
7     for each order Jh  in Q 
8         if Pn >= PF 
9             push Jh  into [P,B 
10 if [P,B ≠ ∅ 
11     3  = VOL_MATCH([P,B, LF) 
 
To solve the special form of the Knapsack Problem 
under(o(limit orders and volume(NL, denoting the final subset 
of orders in an optimum solution for the original problem as(3e, 
we then use the notation OPT o, NL  to denote the sum of the 
order volumes of the first(o(orders in the subset(3(under the 
constraint( pqr o, NL − (NL ≤ )C. The sum in the first N-1, 
N-2,…,1 orders can then be represented as OPT o − 1, NL , 
OPT o − 2, NL , …, OPT 1, NL . To determine OPT o, NL , 
we not only need the solution of OPT o − 1, NL , but also need 
to know OPT o − 1, NL − (Ne , the best solution for the first 
N-1 orders with the remaining capacity NL −(Ne , which 
constructs the constraint as( pqr o − 1, NL − NL −(Ne ≤)C. The recursion can then be summarised as follows: if(Je(is 
not one of the orders in the final subset(3e, we can ignore the 
order N and determine OPT o − 1, NL ; however if(Je(is one 
of the orders, we need to seek an optimal solution for the 
remaining orders, 1,.., N-1, which is OPT o − 1, NL − (Ne . 
Using this set of sub-problems, we are able to express the 
OPT o, NL  as a simple expression in terms of values from 
“smaller” problems. Therefore, the recursion is summarised as 
two conditions: 
1.! If(Jh ∉ 3e, then OPT o, NL = OPT o − 1, NL ; 
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2.! If(Jh ∈ 3e , then OPT o, NL =Ne+ OPT o − 1, NL −NL ; 
This recursive process is re-organised based on the above two 
conditions to give Algorithm 4. This recursive algorithm can be 
used by invoking OPT o, NL ( for (o( limit orders and the 
capacity(NL. 
F.! Fine detection – collusion search  Sv, orders from([(matched with the incoming order(JL, is the 
result of the coarse detection. To further detect the potential 
closed cycle of transactions, the orders in Sv are represented by 
equation (1), where the trader ID and volumes are affixed with 
trading direction signs. After the conversion, Sv is defined 
as3ew , the input of the fine detection algorithm FINE_DETECT. 
As discussed in Section III.A and equation (2), the order pairs 
with potential transaction prices with overlapped price margins 
are grouped together for potential collusion detection. 
Detecting trader collusion is treated as discovering the 
combinations(x(from(3e(such that the sum of the signed trader 
equals zero as illustrated in equation (6). This process can be 
considered equivalent to a special case of the previously 
defined volume matching problem: given a capacity W=0 (the 
knapsack size) and a set of signed trader(pairs, each having a 
value (e.g. +A  and ( −A ), select all possible subsets C  of 
signed trader ( pairs to make ( 5=L:==∈{ = W , where the 
symbolic computation of the signed trader(pairs are defined in 
Section A and can be implemented by operator overloading. 
The subset(x(is considered as trading collusion in a wash trade. 
Algorithm 5, derived from Algorithm 4, provides the 
recursive solution for FINE_DETECT Sv} . 
 
Algorithm 4 Volume Matching Detection by recursion  
1 VOL_MATCH([P,B, JL) // original limit order set [P,B; 
2     3e = ∅; // solution subset, initialized to empty; 
3     o = length [P,B ; // N: size of [P,B; 
4 OPT o(, JL  // N decreases on each recursion step; 
5     if o < 1 or JL ≤ )C  // if N reaches the last one or()C( 
condition is satisfied; 6         return; 
7     if Ne (− JL ≤ )C  // if condition is satisfied, then orders 
8         output(3e; in(3e  is one solution; 
9     push Je  into 3e  // assume Je ∈ 3e; 
10 ((((OPT o − 1, Ne − Je,C ; // recursively find solution by  
condition 2; 
11     Discard Je  from 3e  // assume Je ∉ 3e; 
12 ((((OPT o − 1, JC= ; // recursively find solution by  
condition 1; 
13 end of OPT  
14 return  3e;  
 
Algorithm 5 Collusion Search by recursion 
1 FINE_DETECT( 3ew ; // original signed trader set(3ew  
2 x = ∅; // solution subset, initialized to empty; 
3 o = length 3ew ; sum = 0 ; // N: size of(3ew ;  
4 OPT o(, sum  // N decreases on each recursion step; 
5    if o < 1 // if N reaches the last one, done 
6            return;  
7    if(rT + sum = 0 // if the sum of signed trader 
 including current one is zero 
8            output(x; // the signed trader in(3ew (is a solution; 
9    push rT into x; // assume(Ke ∈ x; 
10    OPT o − 1(, sum + rT ; // recursively find solution by  
condition 2; 
11    Discard rT from x; // assume(Ke ∉ x; 
12    OPT o − 1(, sum ; // recursively find solution by condition 1; 
13 end of OPT  
14 return  x;  
IV.! EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION 
Evaluating a detection model usually relies on real data of 
both “normal” and “abuse” cases. However, due to the limited 
reports on wash trade manipulation and regulatory rules 
prohibiting the disclosure of illegitimate market data, the 
availability of the examples of wash trade behaviours in capital 
markets is far less than the availability of routine normal 
trading records. Therefore to evaluate the proposed detection 
model, it is acceptable to the financial industry that all the 
characteristic patterns of wash trade examples are reproduced 
then injected into original trading records to generate a mixed 
dataset of normal and abuse cases (NANEX, Exploratory 
Trading in the eMini, 2013). Randomly synthesised exploratory 
manipulation cases can mimic any possibility of wash trade 
scenarios, i.e. we can generate the matched order at any time 
with any volume size as well as matching margins. Synthetic 
exploratory financial data are also accepted in academia for 
evaluating the proposed model when real market data are hard 
to collect (Palshikar & Apte, 2008) (Ou, Cao, Luo, & Zhang, 
Dec. 2008) (Markus., Hoser, & Schröder, 2007). In this paper, 
the experimental evaluation is composed of two parts: 
Part 1: experimental evaluation using original trading 
datasets from the market; 
Part 2: experimental evaluation using original trading 
datasets injected with synthetically generated wash trade 
scenarios following the analysis in Section II.A. 
 
A.! Experiment Setup 
The experimental data used in this work involve real market 
data (trading orders) of seven stocks Google (GOOG), 
Microsoft (MSFT) and Apple (AAPL) from NASDAQ and 
First Quantum Minerals (FQM), Yamana Gold (YAU), 
Gazprom (OGZD), and Vodafone (VOD) from London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). The selection of these datasets is due to their 
active trading activities, relatively high trading volumes and 
more volatile price fluctuation, the factors that might increase 
the likelihood of market abuse across the exchanges (Douglas, 
Feng, & Aitken, 2012) (Lee, Eom, & Park, 2013). The datasets 
from NASDAQ cover messages over five trading days from 
11th – 15th June 2012, and consist of more than 400,000 trading 
orders in total for each stock. The datasets from LSE cover 23rd 
– 27th May 2011, and consist of more than 100,000 orders in 
total for each stock. Table 1 shows an excerpt of the trading 
records used in this study. The wash trade detection algorithms 
are evaluated on the original seven datasets for detecting any 
transactions which are suspiciously similar to wash trade 
manipulation. Additionally, typical wash trade activities are 
reproduced according to the discussions and examples in Table 
5Table 6 and injected into those seven datasets for further 
experimental evaluations. 
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B.! Determining the marginal parameters 
As discussed in Section II.A, the submissions of the matched 
orders in a wash trade are usually within tiny time intervals()P 
so that the manipulated execution can compete against the 
action of normal traders who may pick the orders 
unintentionally (FSA, 2006) (Bowen, 2013). Consequently, the 
normal execution time shows a reasonable reference to the time 
interval()P, which otherwise is not available because of the lack 
of the statistical studies of the real wash trade cases. 
Usually, the execution time of a limit order is strongly 
associated with its volume (Douglas, Feng, & Aitken, 2012) 
(Hautsch & Huang, The market impact of a limit order, 2012) 
(Hautsch & Huang, Limit Order Flow, Market Impact and 
Optimal Order Sizes: Evidence from NASDAQ 
TotalView-ITCH Data, 2011). Therefore, a more reasonable 
measure of the average execution time of normal limit orders 
can be given by volume-weighted average execution time 
(VWAT), defined as 
 :^ ÅÇ* = *É∗CÉÉ CÉÉ  , (7) 
where :^ ÅÇ* is volume-weighted average execution time; :Ö is 
the execution time of order Ü; áÖ is the volume of order Ü; and Ü 
is each individual order (Hautsch & Huang, Limit Order Flow, 
Market Impact and Optimal Order Sizes: Evidence from 
NASDAQ TotalView-ITCH Data, 2011). In practice, if the 
wash trade orders are submitted with time intervals larger 
than(:^ ÅÇ*, they are apparently easy to pick by other legitimate 
traders. Accordingly, by setting (δg = :^ ÅÇ* , this approach 
covers a time period for all possible wash trade activities. The 
order execution time(:Ö and the(:^ ÅÇ* across the seven stocks 
in the test dataset are calculated and summarized in Table 7. 
Theoretically, the wash trade can be carried out by a large 
number of small orders. However, in practice, the wash trade 
orders are usually larger than the average volume of the normal 
trading orders because a large number of orders can 
significantly increase the uncertainty of the order executions, 
which may bring a risk of loss if it does not follow the expected 
arrangements. Therefore, the average order volume of each 
stock is selected as the threshold (Z^( for the order volume 
filtering discussed in Section D. The average volume across 
seven stocks is also calculated and summarized in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 Volume weighted average execution  
Time and average volume 
 :Ö  (sec.) :^ ÅÇ*(sec.) Avg. Vol (share) 
GOOG 2.77 118.79 635.57 
MSFT 3.07 107.68 530.70 
AAPL 5.92 87.04 900.04 
FQM 10.19 83.87 163.20 
YAU 14.35 104.25 878.46 
OGZD 6.04 52.35 796.30 
VOD 12.97 71.15 661.16 
 
In addition, the volume matching margin(δ- is selected as 
percentages:  0%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4% and 5% indicating the ratio 
of not matching (1% refers identifying orders with 99% 
matching volumes). In the example in Table 6, the #5 buy order 
volume (1500 shares) is around 96.7% matched with all 
previous sell orders (1450 shares). The price margin ()B is 
unconstrained in the detection so that any orders following the 
price matching rules Rule 1 and Rule 2 are scanned for possible 
matching pairs under the condition in equation (5).  
Under the configurations of()P,(Z^,δ-, and()B, Algorithm 4 
reflects the fact that given an order(JL, among all executable 
priced orders (unconstrained()B but following Rule 1 and 2) 
with volume not smaller than(Z^ in a previous )P(time period, 
find the matched orders that executed at least (1-)C)% volumes 
of(JL. 
 
C.! Part 1: Experiments on original datasets 
In Part 1 experiment, the wash trade detection algorithm is 
evaluated on the original seven datasets using the parameters in 
Section IV.B. The evaluation shows the applicability of the 
proposed algorithms to real transaction data and also examines 
the legitimacy of the transactions in original dataset. Since the 
original datasets do not contain any reported wash trade 
manipulation activities, it is assumed to only contain legitimate 
transactions. Thus the evaluation measure is based on false 
negative rate, àoâ = äeäeã*å, which is based on false negative, 
FN, defined as normal cases detected as a wash trade, and true 
positive, TP, defined as normal cases detected as normal. 
The results of the experiments (max FNR values on each 
stock dataset are highlighted) are shown in Table 8. It is clear 
that in each dataset, some transactions are detected as 
suspicious wash trade actions and the numbers of the detected 
actions increase across the increases of volume margins. Most 
of the datasets do not contain any suspicious actions when the 
volume margin is set to 0% and the Apple stock shows the 
highest FNR rate (1.263%) at the 5% volume margin. 
With careful inspection and consultation with the financial 
industry experts, we determined that the detected false negative 
cases show very similar features to the wash trade actions 
although not reported by the regulators. The detected false 
negative cases fall into two formats as shown in Table 9. 
 
 
Table 8 Experiment results (FNR) across original  
datasets of seven stocks  
stock Volume Margins 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 
GOOG 0.000% 0.046% 0.059% 0.073% 0.093% 0.096% 
MSFT 0.000% 0.030% 0.176% 0.275% 0.519% 0.530% 
AAPL 0.000% 0.000% 0.166% 0.576% 1.153% 1.263% 
FQM 0.389% 0.499% 0.526% 0.553% 0.673% 0.926% 
YAU 0.000% 0.669% 0.761% 0.780% 0.853% 1.186% 
OGZD 0.000% 0.346% 0.519% 0.680% 0.693% 0.853% 
VOD 0.000% 0.953% 1.048% 1.066% 1.143% 1.219% 
 
In case #1, the trader Client12 sold 6600 shares to Client3 at 
price 58.0 and bought 6606 back 2 seconds later at the same 
price. The 99.9% matched transacted volumes, 100% matched 
prices and the closed cycle of the transaction directions 
between Client12 and Client3 make this case extremely 
suspicious and potentially be a wash trade action according to 
the regulation (SEC, 2011) although not reported yet. Detecting 
such suspicious activities shows effectiveness of the proposed 
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algorithms, although recognising the real intention behind such 
cases requires more inspections from the regulators, which is 
out of the scope of our work. In case #2, Client1 sold 15000 
shares to Client5 at price 58.56 at market closing time and 
bought them all back at slightly higher price at market opening 
time on the next day. Those transactions also fulfill the 
conditions of a wash trade action except the trading dates. 
According to the suggestions from financial experts, case #2 
refers to pre-arranged trading, which is defined as “a sell is 
coupled with a buy back at the same or pre-arranged price that 
limits the risks” (SEC, 2011). The only difference between 
pre-arranged trading and wash trade is that the former is usually 
among merely two parties and may occur in different days and 
the latter can involve a number of collusive traders and usually 
occurs as intra-day trading. When only targeting wash trade, the 
proposed algorithms can be applied on intra-day transactions to 
avoid picking up the pre-arranged trading as case #2, although 
the pre-arranged trading is also illegal (SEC, 2011) and needs to 
be monitored and banned from the capital markets. 
 
Table 9 False Negative cases of stock AAPL 
case# time volume price seller buyer 
1 21/06/2012 15:18:48.768 6600 58.00 Client12 Client3 21/06/2012 15:20:11.811 6606 58.00 Client3 Client12 
2 21/06/2012 16:28:40.629 15000 58.56 Client1 Client5 22/06/2012 10:00:45.187 15000 58.60 Client5 Client1 
 
D.! Part 2: Experiments on datasets with injected wash trade 
Testing with synthetic data can mimic any possible wash 
trade cases and also can evaluate the robustness of the proposed 
algorithms under any wash trade scenarios, i.e. random 
combinations of one or multiple traders wash trade activities.  
1)! Wash Trade Case Generation 
The typical wash trade activities are reproduced and injected 
in each stock dataset. The activities are reproduced in two 
format groups: 
Group 1: one order matched with single opposite order, 
termed as “single-matching”;  
Group 2: one order matched with multiple opposite orders, 
termed as “multi-matching”. 
Each group contains three different sets according to trader 
numbers in the wash trade collusion: set #1 has examples with 
one trader in a trading collusion; set #2 and #3 has two and four 
traders in a trading collusion respectively. To ensure a 
comprehensive assessment of the approach, in each set, volume 
matching margin()C is selected as a percentage 0%, 1%, 2%, 
3%, 4% and 5% indicating the ratio of not matching (1% 
indicating the orders from two sides are 99% matching). There 
are 10 examples for each combination of the above parameters.  
 
Table 10 Generated single matched  
Wash Trade cases (δ-=5%) 
Case Trader Time Buy/Sell Price Volume pairs 
#1 
A 9:00:000 Sell 58.00 5000 1 B 9:00:001 Buy 58.01 4750 
A 9:15:000 Buy 58.01 5000 2 B 9:15:001 Sell 58.00 4750 
#2 
A 12:16:000 Sell 58.00 5000 1 B 12:16:100 Buy 58.05 4750 
C 13:00:001 Buy 58.05 4750 2 
B 13:00:002 Sell 58.00 5000 
C 13:20:001 Sell 58.00 5000 3 D 13:20:002 Buy 58.05 4750 
A 14:20:001 Buy 58.05 4750 4 D 14:20:002 Sell 58.00 5000 
 
Table 11 Generated multiple matched  
Wash Trade cases (δ-=5%) 
Case Trader Time Buy/Sell Price Volume pairs 
#3 
A 9:00:100 Sell 58.00 1100 
1 
A 9:00:100 Sell 58.01 1200 
A 9:00:100 Sell 58.02 1000 
A 9:00:100 Sell 58.03 1400 
B 9:00:101 Buy 58.05 5000 
B 10:10:000 Sell 58.00 1000 
2 
B 10:10:000 Sell 58.01 1300 
B 10:10:000 Sell 58.02 1200 
B 10:10:000 Sell 58.03 1250 
A 10:10:100 Buy 58.05 5000 
 
The examples in Table 10 and Table 11 show an excerpt of 
the generated wash trade cases: case #1: two traders with 5% 
single matched volumes; case #2: four traders with 5% single 
matched volumes; case #3: two traders with 5% multiple 
matched volumes. The volume, time and matching margin of 
the synthetic orders are all randomly generated. For example, in 
case 3 in Table 11, buy order volume(á\ in pair 1 is randomly 
generated (under condition: á\ (≥ Z^() and all sell orders in 
pair 1 are also randomly generated under the condition that 
volume sum(N] of all sell orders satisfies: á\ ∗ 1 − δv ≤ N] ≤á\. The time of orders in pair 2 are also randomly generated as 
long as they are much later than the time of pair 1. Similarly, 
the prices of order in each pairs are randomly generated 
following the price matching rules discussed in Section III.E. 
Similar to the examples in Table 6, two order pairs in Table 11 
have different transaction prices. The buy order in pair #1 in 
Table 11 will be executed with the previous four sell orders at 
58, 58.01, 58.02 and 58.03 respectively. Therefore, the 
generated examples have different transaction prices within 
transaction margins. 
Such random generation of synthetic cases provides the 
possibility of thorough evaluation of the proposed algorithms 
using any possible wash trade cases. 
As discussed before, the models are tested on seven real 
stocks, each of which contains two groups of injected 
examples. Each group has three sets (1, 2 and 4 traders) and 
each set contains six margin configurations. Under each 
configuration, there are 10 examples. There are overall((7×2×3×6×10 = 2520(different experiments carried out as a robust 
evaluation plan for the proposed detection model. 
The generated wash trade orders are then injected into the 
data of corresponding stocks making the test data a mixture of 
both “normal” and “abuse” patterns. The time intervals 
between different pairs are selected randomly as examples in 
Table 10 and Table 11. For example, in case #1 in Table 10, 
time of pair 2 is randomly selected after the pair 1 occurs. In 
addition, the generated orders in each pair are separated by 
several normal orders in original datasets to mimic the practical 
case in the markets. This is a practical approach to simulate 
how these wash trade scenarios occur in the real world (Cao, 
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Ou, & Yu, 2012). 
 
2)! Performance evaluation metrics 
The performance evaluation of the proposed model is based 
on two popular statistical measures: sensitivity (SEN) and 
specificity (SPE). Both of them are based on the confusion 
matrix, where a false positive (FP) is defined as a wash trade 
case detected as normal; a true negative (TN) is defined as a 
wash trade case detected as wash trade, and a false negative 
(FN) and a true positive (TP) which are defined in Section 
IV.C. The sensitivity, defined as (SEN = TP/(TP + FN) , 
represents the rate of correctly detecting normal trading orders 
(a.k.a. the true positive rate) while the specificity, defined 
as (SPE = TN/(FP + TN) , refers to the rate of correctly 
detecting wash trade cases (a.k.a the true negative rate). 
 
3)! Experimental Results 
The experimental evaluations across seven stocks are 
summarized in Fig. 4, where the average SEN and SPE values 
across different numbers of traders are illustrated against the 
margin values. 
From Fig. 4, the SPE values for single-matching show that 
the algorithm completely detects the single matching cases, 
which is the simplest wash trade format and is apparently easy 
to detect. The SPE values for multi-matching vary across the 
margins and the different stocks as the illustrations in Fig. 4. 
The SPE values increase with the increase of the margins and 
approach 100% when the margin is higher than 5%. The result 
conforms to the design expectation of the detection approach: 
more possible collusions will be detected under bigger 
matching margins. As discussed in Section II.A, “mostly 
matched” (for example 98%) orders might be built by “smart 
manipulators” for standing aside from the inspections. A big 
marginal value compensates this “smart tactic” and the 
configurability of the margin increases the practicability of the 
model in a real trading context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Experiment results across seven stock dataset. 
 
The SEN values show more volatile results across the 
margins. In most experiments, the sensitivity values reduce as 
the margin increases indicating more normal activities 
incorrectly detected as wash trade cases. On the contrary, the 
highest SEN value appears at the zero margin value. 
From the experimental results, it can be concluded that the 
proposed approach detects the primary wash trade scenarios 
effectively and consistently across the selected stocks with 
SEN values in a range of 97% to 100%. 
V.! CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A wash trade activity detection approach is proposed after 
thoroughly studying the various scenarios of wash trade 
behaviours. The analysis of the collusive activities in wash 
trades through a graph of traders with transactions represented 
by the directed connections among the vertexes shows the basic 
structure of the collusion among multiple traders following a 
closed cycle of the transactions among certain traders. Further 
studies also show that the limit orders in wash trades are usually 
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submitted fast with mutually executed prices and matched 
volumes. According to the analysed features, the proposed 
method is then split into steps defined separately in Algorithm 4 
and Algorithm 5. 
There are two major innovations in the proposed method:  
1.! Graph theory has been used to represent and model the 
collusive relationships of the traders in wash trade 
activities. The concluded fundamental structure of the 
closed cycle structure within a trader graph simplifies 
the detection from the complexity of the collusive 
networks; 
2.! The wash trade order detection has been approached 
as a Knapsack problem which can be solved in two 
steps by traditional dynamic programming 
approaches.  
Instead of only detecting the same-priced buy/sell orders in 
the “engine level” detection mechanism in CME, the proposed 
method determines the wash trade activities by considering the 
suspicious matched orders as well as the collusive groups, 
which are according to the trading activities in a certain time 
period rather than a tiny time interval in real-time detection. 
Therefore, the proposed approach best suits over-night 
detection in real financial world. However, the rapidly growing 
trading frequency challenges detection mechanisms and hence 
implementing the proposed approach in real-time in a 
computationally efficient way will be the focus of future work. 
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